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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) provides this court with appellate jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court erred in reconsidering its prior decision denying

Riverview Financial Corporation ("Riverview")1 summary judgment on Mariamercedes
Power's ("Power") claim for breach of an implied "for-cause" employment contract?
Questions of whether a trial court complied with the rules of civil procedure are
questions of law. See Avila v. Winn. 794 P.2d 20. 22 (Utah 1990). This court accords "no
particular deference to the determinations of law made by the trial court but review[s] them
for correctness." Id.
2.

Whether the trial court erred in granting Riverview summary judgment on

Power's claim for breach of an implied "for-cause" employment contract?
Summary Judgment is proper when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c). "As a question of law, this decision is reviewed for correctness." Evans v. GTE
Health Systems Inc.. 857 P.2d 974, 976 (Utah App. 1993).
DETERMINATIVE RULES
A determination of the issues presented requires an analysis of Utah R. Civ. P.
54(b), 56, 60(b) and 61. Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(6) and (f), Riverview has
reproduced these rules at tab MA" of the attached Addendum.

1

Riverview was, at all times relevant, a parent company of Mrs. Fields Cookies and the
actual employer of the corporate personnel working within the Mrs. Fields' organization.
79504.1
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action grows out of Power's discharge from employment with Riverview. In a
five-count amended complaint filed in September of 1990, Power alleged that Riverview
(1) breached an implied-in-fact employment contract to terminate her only "for cause",
(2) breached a written contract to terminate her only in accordance with "express written
company policies and procedures," (3) breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
(4) committed fraudulent misrepresentation and (5) committed intentional infliction of
emotional distress. R. at 8-14.
On December 18, 1990, Riverview moved to dismiss Power's claim for breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. R. at 51-52. The trial court granted Riverview's motion by order dated April 10,
1991. R. at 109-10.
Shortly thereafter, Riverview moved for summary judgment on the four remaining
claims. R. at 119-21. The trial court originally granted Riverview summary judgment on the
tort claims and denied Riverview summary judgment on the contract claims. R. at 407-08.
Upon reconsideration, however, the trial court granted Riverview summary judgment on the
breach of written contract claim, leaving only Power's claim for breach of an implied-in-fact
"for-cause" employment contact for trial. R. at 452 & 461-62. 2
2

Riverview also filed a motion in limine to preclude Power "from introducing into
evidence statements relating to a corporate outlook of 'fairness'" or Riverview's "nonbinding
disciplinary policy." R. at 500. Power represents that this is "the very evidence on which
Judge Wilkinson relied in denying Riverview summary judgment." Brief of Appellant at 5.
The problem with Power's representation is that Judge Wilkinson never even remotely
suggested why he denied Riverview summary judgment on the implied "for-cause"
(continued...)
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Nearly a year later, the Utah Supreme Court handed down its decisions in
Sanderson v. First Security Leasing, 844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992), and Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah.
Inc.. 844 P.2d 331 (Utah 1992). Based upon these decisions, Riverview requested relief from
the trial court's prior order denying it summary judgment on the implied "for-cause"
employment contract claim. R. at 812-13. The trial court granted Riverview's motion in a
Memorandum Decision dated March 18, 1993 (tab "B"), and, on May 25, 1993, entered a
formal order awarding Riverview summary judgment on that claim (tab "C"). R. at 980-84 &
986-87.
On June 24, 1993, Power filed a notice of appeal (tab "D") from the trial court's
May 25th order. R. at 989. Power has not appealed the dismissal of her claim for breach of a
written contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentation or
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On November 30, 1988, Power began working for Riverview as the administrative

assistant to the three Senior Regional Directors of Operations. R. at 9, 126 & 145.

2

(... continued)
employment contract claim. Power then represents that, Judge Noel denied the motion in
limine, "specifically finding that Power's evidence of an implied-in-fact contract was
sufficient to require jury consideration." Id. That never happened. Judge Noel actually
ruled that while the evidence Riverview sought to exclude "may not, without something
further, constitute a contract, they may have relevance when viewed together with all the
facts and circumstances/ R. at 709. Judge Noel then went on to note that Judge Wilkinson
had ruled that there existed "a question of fact sufficient to submit the matter to a jury." Id.
Judge Noel, however, was not asked to, and did not, reconsider the propriety of Judge
Wilkinson's determination.
79504.1
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2.

The next day, December 1, 1988, Power filled out and signed an Application

for Employment with Riverview. The beginning of the application provides in relevant part:
All employees of the Company are "at-will" employees subject to
termination at anytime with or without cause.
And immediately above Power's signature, the application reads:
Further, I understand and agree that my employment is for no definite
period and may, regardless of the date of payment of my wages and
salary, be terminated without any previous notice.
R. at 126 & 141-42.
3.

In April of 1989, Power became the administrative assistant to Paul Baird,

Director of Operations. R. at 126 & 146-48.
4.

The Riverview Policy and Procedures Manual that Powerreviewedduring her

employment isrepletewith plain language declaring that employment with Riverview is at will:
In addition, the Company reserves the right to terminate any employee at
will.
* * *

At THE COMPANY all employees are "at-will" employees subject to
termination at any time with or without cause.
* * *

GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE TERMINATION
As noted, THE COMPANY reserves the right to terminate immediately.
The following are violations that are Grounds for Immediate Termination:
* * *

The above list is not all inclusive. It bv no means covers all violations
that could occur during employment, and THE COMPANY reserves the
right to terminate at will.
R. at 127, 151-55 & 167-71.

79504.1
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5.

The Riverview Employee Handbook, which Power also reviewed, repeatedly

proclaims in the simplest of terms that all employment with Riverview is at will:
This handbook is provided as a guide which you may use to familiarize
yourself with The Company. It is provided and is intended only as a
helpful guide. It does not constitute, nor should it be construed to
constitute an agreement or contract of employment, express or implied, or
as a promise of treatment in any particular manner in any given situation.
This handbook states only general Company guidelines. The Company
may, at any time,in its sole discretion, modify or vary from anything
stated in this handbook.
This handbook supersedes all prior handbooks, manuals, policies and
procedures issued by the Company.
* * *

The Company is an "at-will" employer which means that any and all team
members are subject to termination at anytime with or without cause.
Although we generally will follow a disciplinary process because we are
an at-will employer, The Company reserves the right to terminate a team
member immediately
* * *

As stated earlier, The Company is an "at-will" employer.
* * *

II. Termination of Employment
Every employee is free to terminate his or her employment at any time,
with or without cause.
* * *

Likewise, The Company is free to terminate an employee's employment
at any time with or without cause.
* * *

As stated earlier, the Company is an "at will" employer. Therefore the
above list is not all-inclusive. The Company will deal with each case
individually, and this information should not be construed as a promise of
a specific treatment in a given situation.

79504.1
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These are some of the grounds for immediate termination. Of course, this
list bv no means covers all violations that could occur during
employment, and Mrs. Fields reserves the right to terminate at will.
R. at 127-28, 156-58 & 173-201.
6.

On June 20, 1989, Power reviewed and signed a one-page Acknowledgment

of Receipt expressly recognizing that her employment relationship with Riverview was at will.
The Company reserves the right to transfer, promote, demote, or
terminate me with or without cause at any time. With or without notice;
and I reserve the right to resign at any time with or without notice.
II. HANDBOOK
Today I received a copy of The Company's Employee Handbook which
has been prepared to give me some general information about company
policy. I understand that neither this Handbook nor any other
representation by a management official of The Company are intended to
create a contract of employment. I understand that The Company and I
have the same right to end my employment at any time for any reason.
R. at 128 & 203.
7.

Riverview discharged Power on January 8, 1990, as part of a reduction in

force necessitated by economic circumstances. More specifically, Riverview eliminated
Power's administrative assistant position as part of an effort to cut costs and improve
productivity at the corporate level. This effort resulted in the elimination of approximately 60
positions (37.5% of the corporate personnel) over a three-year period. R. at 9, 128, 205-08,
210-12, 214, 390 & 403-04; Reisner deposition (tab "E") at 6 & 54-55.
8.

Power's duties were spread among the remaining administrative assistants

and her position, once eliminated, has never been subsequently filled. R. at 128 & 205-08;
tab ME" at 6 & 84.

79504.1
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9.

Tellingly, Power, in order to secure unemployment benefits, certified under

penalty of fine and imprisonment that she had been laid off by Riverview. R. at 128 & 216.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This court must affirm the trial court in all respects. First, Timm v. Dewsnup. 851
P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993), makes it clear that the trial court acted correctly when it reconsidered
its previous decision denying Riverview summary judgment on Power's implied-in-fact
contract claim. Second, because no reasonable jury could have found that Power had
overcome the presumption of at-will employment, the trial court also acted correctly when it
granted Riverview summary judgment on that claim; alternatively, summary judgment was
appropriate because the undisputed facts establish that Riverview terminated Power for good
cause in a reduction in force.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court's Reconsideration of its Prior Decision Denying Riverview
Summary Judgment on Power's Claim for Breach of an Implied "For-Cause"
Employment Contract Was Entirely Appropriate.
Power argues that Riverview relied upon Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(7) in bringing its

Motion for Relief from Order, that "Riverview had to show unusual and exceptional
circumstances" to prevail on that motion, and that Riverview presented "nothing extraordinary
for . . . [the trial court] to consider." Brief of Appellant at 15. Power's analysis of this issue
is wrong.
"Any judge is free to change his or her mind on the outcome of a case until a
decision is formally rendered/ Bennion v. Hansen. 699 P.2d 757. 760 (Utah 19851 Timm.
851 P.2d 1178, is directly on-point. There, defendant, Althea Dewsnup, appealed the trial
79504.1
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court's denial of several motions including one to reconsider a summary judgment. Id. at
1179. "The trial court denied Mrs. Dewsnup's motion to reconsider the summary judgment,
stating that 'no such motion exists under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.'" Id. at 1184.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed and ordered "the trial court to address the motion on its
merits" holding "that pursuant to the provisions of rule 54(b), because the summary judgment
was 'subject to revision,'3 a motion to reconsider is a reasonable means of requesting such a
revision and is therefore permitted." Id. at 1185. See also Kennedy v. New Era Indus., Inc..
600 P.2d 534, 536-37 (Utah 1979); Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. James Constructors. 761 P.2d 42,
44-45 (Utah App. 1988).
Here, as in Timm. Riverview asked the trial court to reconsider its disposition of a
summary judgment that was "subject to revision. "4 The trial court granted Riverview's
request; the trial court would have erred if it had not done so. There it stands.
Alternatively, even if the trial court did err in reconsidering the summary judgment,
a remand for this reason would be inappropriate under the harmless error standard. Rule 61
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is controlling; it provides in pertinent part:

3

A summary "judgment is 'subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties'" unless certified as
a final judgment. Timm. 851 P.2d at 1184 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b)).
4

That Riverview's request for reconsideration was styled Defendant's Motion for Relief
from Order and originally brought pursuant to rule 60(b) is of no consequence. First, the
motion was properly brought under that rule. See Rees v. Albertson's. Inc.. 587 P.2d 130,
131-32 (Utah 1978) (use of 60(b) as a mechanism for reconsidering denial of summary
judgment upheld). Second, regardless, both Power and the trial court treated Riverview's
motion as one for reconsideration. R. at 942, 955 & 983-84.
79504.1
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[N]o error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted
by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for . . . disturbing a
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
An error substantially affects the rights of a party when "there is reasonable likelihood that in
its absence there would have been a different result." Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-Dav
Saints Hospital. 348 P.2d 935 (Utah 1960). In light of the trial court's ruling that, as a matter
of law, Power could not make out a claim for breach of an implied "for-cause" employment
contract, there was no such error here for the result—dismissal of Power's claim—would have
been the same except that all of the parties would have unnecessarily spent thousands of
additional dollars in litigation costs.
D.

The Trial Court Properly Granted Riverview Summary Judgment on Power's
Claim for Breach of an Implied "For-Cause" Employment Contract.
Power next argues that she introduced sufficient "evidence of Riverview's intent and

Power's reasonable expectation of 'for cause' contract terms" to avoid summary judgment.5
Brief of Appellant at 20. Power's position is without merit.

5

Power, in the opening of her brief, phrases the issue at hand in terms of whether she
had an implied-in-fact employment contract "whereby she could only be terminated for
cause, after disciplinary counseling, and an opportunity to correct deficiencies." Brief of
Appellant at 1-2. That is an incorrect statement of the issue. A correct statement is:
Whether Power had an implied-in-fact employment contract whereby she could only be
terminated "for cause"? To this end, Riverview notes (1) that Power's claim in her
complaint for breach of an implied employment contract centers on whether "she was a 'for
cause' employee;" (2) that Power is only appealing the trial court's decision granting
Riverview summary judgment on her implied "for-cause" employment contract claim and
(3) that Power's docketing statement (tab "F") defines the issue presented on appeal in terms
of the "for-cause" standard. R. at 2 & 989.
79504.1
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A.

Power Is Bound by the Provisions in the Riverview Employment
Application and Handbooks Stating that Employment is Terminable At
Will.

Utah law presumes that employment for "no specified term of duration" is at will.
Berube v. Fashion Centre. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989) (Durham, J f joined by
Stewart, J.); see also id. at 1051 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result). An employee
may overcome this presumption by proving the existence of an implied agreement with his or
her employer to terminate the employment relationship only "for cause". Id. at 1044 & 1051.
An implied agreement to terminate "for cause", however, cannot contradict an express
contractual provision providing for employment at will. See Johnson v. Morton ThiokoL Inc..
818 P.2d 997, 1004 (Utah 1991) (citing Brehanv v. Nordstrom. Inc.. 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah
1991)); Berube. 771 P.2d at 1044.
Here, Power and Riverview expressly memorialized in the Application for
Employment Power signed when she began working for Riverview their understanding that
Power's employment with Riverview was at will. Power's application reads:
All employees of the Company are "at-will" employees subject to
termination at anytime with or without cause.
* * *

Further, I understand and agree that my employment is for no definite
period and may, regardless of the date of payment of my wages and
salary, be terminated without any previous notice.
Fact 1 2. Power and Riverview then expressly reaffirmed this understanding in the
Acknowledgment Power signed in June of 1989:

79504.1
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The Company reserves the right to transfer, promote, demote, or
terminate me with or without cause at any time. With or without notice;
and I reserve the right to resign at any time with or without notice.
H. HANDBOOK
Today I received a copy of The Company's Employee Handbook which
has been prepared to give me some general information about company
policy. I understand that neither this Handbook nor any other
representation by a management official of The Company are intended to
create a contract of employment. I understand that The Company and I
have the same right to end my employment at any time for any reason.
Fact 1 6.6 Additionally, Riverview also unequivocally disclaimed in its Policy and
Procedures Manual and Employee Handbook any intent to fetter its right to discharge
employees at will. See Fact U 2-3. Evidence of express recognition of at-will status by both
employer and employee just does not get any better than Power's signed application and
Acknowledgment and Riverview's disclaimers.
Because the law bars the consideration of implied contractual terms that are
inconsistent with express contractual terms where, as here, the express terms are laid out in a
signed employment application or acknowledgment or in clear and conspicuous disclaimers,
the trial court properly entered summary judgment. See Hodgson. 844 P.2d at 334 ("when an
employee handbook contains a clear and conspicuous disclaimer of contractual liability, any

6

Power disputes that she acknowledged her at-will status by signing this one-page form
as she "did not stop and think and analyze specific sentences/ Brief of Appellant at 22.
Power's assertion is irrelevant. It is an elementary principle of contract jurisprudence that
parties cannot avoid the consequences of what they have signed by later claiming that they
did not read or understand it. See Lewis v. Penthouse Intern. Ltd.. 825 F. Supp. 131, 133
(S.D. Texas 1992).
79504.1
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other agreement terms must be construed in light of the disclaimer"); Basich v. Target Stores.
Inc.. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16336, *7 (Or. 1992) (disclaimer prevented "as a matter of law,
the formation of an implied contract"); Bvkonen v. United Hospital. 479 N. W.2d 140, 142
(N.D. 1992) ("presence of a clear and conspicuous disclaimer in the employee handbook"
preserved the presumption of at-will employment); Johnson. 818 P.2d at 1003 ("We also note
that a number of jurisdictions have held that a clear and conspicuous disclaimer, as a matter of
law, prevents employee manuals or other like material from being considered as implied-infact contract terms"); Schloz v. Montgomery Ward & Co.. Inc.. 468 N.W.2d 845, 849 (Mich.
1991) (signed acknowledgment of at-will status prevented enforcement of contrary implied
contract); Grimes v. Allied Stores Corp.. 768 P.2d 528, 528-29 (Wash. App. 1989)
(employee's "specific agreement in her application preempted] the arguably inconsistent
policy manual"); Reid v. Sears. Roebuck and Co.. 790 F.2d 453, 460-62 (6th Cir. 1986) (atwill provision in employment application constituted express contract barring any contrary
implied contract).
B.

Power Had No More than a Mere Subjective Expectancy that She Would
Be Terminated Only "For Cause".

Even if Power had not agreed to an express term of employment at will, Riverview
would still be entitled to summary judgment for two independent reasons. First, no reasonable
jury could conclude that Power and Riverview ever settled upon an implied "for-cause"
agreement restricting the company's right to discharge Power. And nif the evidence presented
is such that no reasonable jury could conclude that the parties agreed to limit the employer's
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right to terminate the employee, it is appropriate for a court to decide the issue as a matter of
law." Johnson. 818 P.2d at 1001.
In order for an implied "for-cause" term to exist, "it must meet the requirements for
an offer of a unilateral contract." Johnson. 818 P.2d at 1002. Accordingly, there must be an
objective "manifestation of the employer's intent that is communicated to the employee and
sufficiently definite to operate as a contract provision. Furthermore, the manifestation . . .
must be of such a nature that the employee can reasonably believe that the employer is making
an offer of employment other than employment at will." Id. A subjective expectation of "forcause " employment does not create an enforceable contractual obligation. See Duncan v.
Rolm-Spec Computers. 917 F.2d 261, 265 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Sepanske v. Bendix
Corp.. 384 N.W.2d 54, 58 (Mich App. 1985)).
The facts of this case do not raise a triable issue as to the existence of an implied
"for-causeM employment contract. (A) Power's employment application distinctly states in two
separate places that the employment is at will and that an employee may be terminated at any
time with or without notice. See Fact 1 2 . (B) Riverview's Policy and Procedures Manual
affirms the at-will nature of employment with Riverview. For example, the Policy and
Procedures Manual provides:
In addition, the Company reserves the right to terminate anv employee at
will.
* * *

At THE COMPANY all employees are "at-will" employees subject to
termination at any time with or without cause.
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Fact f 3. (C) Riverview's Employee Handbook insists upon the employee's at-will status in
even greater detail. It provides, by way of example, that:
The Company is an "at-will" employer which means that any and all team
members are subject to termination at anytime with or without cause.
Although we generally will follow a disciplinary process because we are
an at-will employer, The Company reserves the right to terminate a team
member immediately.
* * *

Every employee is free to terminate his or her employment at any time,
with or without cause.
* * *

Likewise, The Company is free to terminate an employee's employment
at any time with or without cause.
Fact 5 4. 7 (D) Finally, Power's signed Acknowledgment presents an unassailable, written
testament of her understanding of the at-will nature of her employment relationship with
Riverview. See Fact 1 6.
No reasonable jury assessing these facts could conclude that Power reasonably
believed that Riverview had offered her an implied-in-fact employment contract to be
discharged only "for cause". Consequently, summary judgment was appropriate. See
Hodgson, 844 P.2d at 332-34 (despite statement by employer's manager to employee during
preemployment interview that employer "followed disciplinary procedures to give employees a

7

Notwithstanding the explicit statements in the Policy and Procedures Manual and the
Employee Handbook to the contrary, Power asks this court to indelibly cast the disciplinary
policy as an inviolate procedure and to ignore the plain language that delineates the policy as
only a guideline that is not to be construed as a contract of employment, promise of specific
treatment, or limitation on Riverview's right to discharge at will. See Fact ft 3-4.
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chance to correct deficiencies," employee "could not have reasonably concluded that
employment was other than at will" given disclaimers and fact that employee signed a "'New
Employee Checklist' which stated that employment was at will"); Johnson. 818 P.2d at 1003
("the only reasonable conclusion an employee or a juror could reach" given handbook's
disclaimer is that employer "intended to retain the right to discharge for any reason");
Duncan. 917 F.2d 263-65 (in light of signed employment application specifying that
employment was at will, statement by manager that employee "would never be terminated" as
long as he "maintained his sales and met his quota each year" and existence of written
performance improvement plan did not provide employee with "a reasonable basis for
concluding that he would be terminated only for just cause"); Vollrath v. Georgia-Pacific
Corp.. 899 F.2d 533, 535 (6th Cir. 1990) (because company had issued disclaimer providing
for at-will employment, employee could not have reasonably relied upon statements by plant
manager that employee "would continue in employment as long as he continued to do his
job"); De Hornev v. Bank of America. 879 F.2d 459, 466 (9th Cir. 1989) (employee could
not have reasonably relied upon personnel policies promising "all employees fair treatment" in
light of express acknowledgement of at-will status);8 Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty. 152 Cal.

8

Courts have had little trouble in rejecting the generalized assertions of job security and
fairness on which Power relies as objective manifestations of an employer's intent to create
an implied "for-cause" employment contract upon which an employee could reasonably rely.
See, e.g.. Evans. 857 P.2d at 977 ("assurances of long-term employment" are "inadequate to
create an implied contract" to terminate "for cause"); Fleming v. AT & T Information
Services. Inc.. 878 F.2d 1472, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (statement in employer's documents
promising "fair and consistent treatment" deemed irrelevant); Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas
Co.. 754 F.2d 884, 886 (10th Cir. 1985) (statement in employer's personnel manual
promising that "the company 'will sever the employment relationship in a fair and consistent
manner' and 'will establish a fair and consistent method' to resolve employee disputes
relating to employment'" too indefinite to form an implied contract).
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App. 3d 467, 482 (Cal. App. 1984) (employee "could not have reasonably relied on any
implied promise . . . which contradicted " the at-will provision contained in signed stock option
agreement).
Second, at a minimum, no reasonable jury could conclude that Power reasonably
believed that any implied "for-cause" employment contract continued in force following the
issuance of the Employee Handbook and her subsequent execution of the attached
Acknowledgment. To this end, to the extent that written or oral representations form an
implied "for-cause" term of an employment contract, it is a term of a unilateral contract. See
Johnson. 818 P.2d at 1002; Brehanv. 812 P.2d at 56. As a result, an employer may
unilaterally amend or abolish that term. Id.; Pratt v. Brown Mach. Co.. 855 F.2d 1225, 1235
(6th Cir. 1988).
The facts in this case establish: (A) that Power signed the Acknowledgment on
June 20, 1989; (B) that the Acknowledgment denotes Power's and Riverview's understanding
that Power was an at-will employee; (C) that the Employee Handbook superseded "all prior
handbooks, manuals, policies and procedures issued" by the company; and (D) that the
Employee Handbook clearly, conspicuously and repeatedly insists that all employment with
Riverview is at will. See Fact M 4 & 6. The facts in this case also establish that the principal
conduct that Power alleges gives rise to an implied "for-cause" employment contract
(including the alleged statements made by Ms. Perry and those contained in the Policy and
Procedures Manual and the video What We Stand For) precede her signing of the
Acknowledgment. R. at 1070 & 1077-79; Brief of Appellant at 8.
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Riverview exercised its right to unilaterally amend its employment relationship with
Power to eliminate any implied "for-cause" provision. Consequently, Power's claim for
breach of that provision cannot stand as a matter of law for whatever reasonable expectations
Power "may have harbored . . . became unreasonable" when Riverview circulated its
Employee Handbook definitively expressing its at-will policy and when Power acknowledged
her at-will status. Pratt. 855 F.2d at 1235 (circulation of handbook including at-will
disclaimer precluded employee from reasonably relying upon earlier statement made to him by
manager that he would not be fired "without just cause").
Schloz. 468 N.W.2d 845, is illustrative. There, plaintiff brought a claim for,
among other things, wrongful termination, alleging that she "had a contract not to be
terminated for refusing to work on Sundays." Id. at 846. Specifically, plaintiff was told by
her manager, through the personnel director, that she would not required to work on Sundays.
Id. Based upon these representations, plaintiff accepted employment with defendant. Yet, for
the next 12 years, defendant, on a sporadic basis, asked plaintiff to work on Sundays and
plaintiff refused, citing her belief that she was not required to do so. Id. In 1982, defendant
issued a policy manual. Attached to the manual was an acknowledgment, which plaintiff
signed, that provided:
I have read and fully understand the rules governing my
employment with Montgomery Ward. I agree to employment with
Montgomery Ward under the conditions explained. I understand these
conditions can be changed by the Company, without notice, at any time.
I also understand and agree that my employment is for no definite period
and may, regardless of the time and manner of payment of any wages and
salary, be terminated at any time, with or without cause, and with or
without notice.
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Id. In 1983, plaintiff was terminated for refusing to work on Sunday and, as a result, brought
suit. Id. After a jury verdict in plaintiffs favor, defendant brought a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, which was denied. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed with
regard to plaintiffs wrongful termination claim holding that "regardless of whether an express
oral contract actually existed at the time of her hiring, as a matter of law, plaintiff and
Montgomery Ward later reached a mutual understanding with regard to termination through
the sign-off sheet" and "that plaintiffs employment with Montgomery Ward was, as a matter
of law, an employment-at-will relationship." Id. at 849. See also Butler v. Portland General
Electric. 54 FEP Cases 357, 365 (Or. 1990) (employer's distribution of handbook with at-will
disclaimer eliminated any just cause requirement arising out of prior statements made to
employee by various managers and statements contained in previous handbook).
C.

Riverview Terminated Power As Part of a Reduction in Force.

Finally, even assuming that Power had an employment contract permitting
termination only "for cause", the trial court correctly concluded that summary judgment was
appropriate. Discharging an employee in a reduction in force brought on by economic
conditions constitutes a "for-cause" dismissal. See Coombs v. Gamer Shoe Co.. 778 P.2d 885
(Mont. 1989); Malmstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum. 231 Cal. Rptr. 820 (Cal. App. 1986);
Clutterham v. Coachmen Industries. Inc.. 215 Cal. Rptr. 795 (Cal. App. 1985).
The undisputed facts establish that Riverview terminated Power as part of a
reduction in force occasioned by business conditions. To this end, it is undisputed that

79504.1

18

Riverview eliminated Power's position as part of a reorganization campaign meant to cut costs
and that, as a result of this effort, Riverview eliminated 60 positions over a three-year period.
Fact 1 7 . It is also undisputed that Riverview distributed Power's duties among the remaining
administrative assistants and has never filled Power's position. Fact 1 8. Indeed, Power
admitted under threat of significant penalty for perjury that Riverview discharged her as part
in a lay off. Fact 1 9. 9
On the strength of these undisputed facts, the trial court was obligated to find that
Riverview had terminated Power with good cause as part of a reduction in force and that
summary judgment was therefore appropriate. Linn v. Beneficial Commercial Corp.. 543

9

Power has taken some liberties with the record in an attempt to escape the fact that she
was terminated as part of a reduction in force. By way of example, Power asserts that Mr.
Baird testified "that Power was terminated for poor performance" and that, based upon that
fact, a jury could "conclude that there was . . . no reduction in force. Brief of Appellant at
25. Mr. Baird actually testified that he had received a directive in mid December 1989 to
cut his staff by two positions, that he made the decision on which positions to cut based upon
relative performance and that Power's administrative assistant position was one of the two
lowest performing positions. R. at 205-08; Baird deposition (tab "G") at 4-11 & 139-40.
Put simply, Mr. Baird decided to keep his most productive positions and to eliminate his
least productive positions; common sense would not have a company downsize in any other
way. By way of further example, Power claims that Mr. Baird "admits that people under his
direction were reassigned to other positions, . . . and that he made no attempt to reassign
Power/ Brief of Appellant at 26. What Mr. Baird actually said is that (1) when the
position of Senior Regional Director of Operations for Mrs. Fields was later eliminated, the
three Senior Regional Directors of Operations went into different positions and (2) he made a
decision not try to place Power into another position "[b]ased on the company's position of
overhead expenses for the upcoming year and the fact that there were no budgeted positions."
R. at 342-43; tab "G" at 6. By way of final example, Power alleges that Daniel Murphy,
Riverview's Director of Human Resources, testified "that changes in the number of personnel
at Riverview were primarily the result of attrition and not as the result of any study." Brief
of Appellant at 26. In fact, Mr. Murphy testified that over a three-year period, Riverview
had downsized from 160 positions to 100 and that while the company "tried to handle it
primarily by attrition" there were "several instances where work [was] . . . consolidated."
R. at 404.
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A.2d 954 (N.J. Super. 1988), is analogous. There, the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed
the grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs claim "that he was fired without good cause
contrary to an implied promise of indefinite employment." Id. at 955. In reaching its
determination, the court wrote: "We thus hold that an action for wrongful discharge does not
generally lie for one whose loss of work is actuated by elimination of the job itself due to
legitimate economic or business reasons, . . . ." Id. at 957. See also Coombs. 778 P.2d 885;
Malmstrom. 231 Cal. Rptr. 820; Clutterham. 215 Cal. Rptr. 795.
Power, like the plaintiff in Linn, was terminated as a result of a decision to
eliminate her position for valid economic reasons. Power has failed to offer a single piece of
evidence suggesting otherwise.10 Summary judgment in favor of Riverview was not only
proper, it was required.
CONCLUSION
As a matter of law, Power cannot rebut the presumption of at-will employment;
additionally, Power cannot overcome the fact that she was terminated due to a reduction in
force. Therefore, Riverview respectfully requests that this court affirm the order of the trial

10

Power finally asserts that Riverview failed to provide discovery on the reduction in
force issue. Brief of Appellant at 2 & 26. What Power neglects to tell this court is that
Riverview objected to this discovery as propounded primarily because it was unduly
burdensome, oppressive and interposed to harass, that Power then brought a motion to
compel and that the trial court denied her motion. R. at 653-63 & 808-09. Power has not
appealed the trial court's denial of her motion to compel.
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court granting Riverview summary judgment on Power's claim for breach of an implied "forcause" employment contract.
DATED this J&'ftay of March, 1994.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH
/ /

Randall N. Skanchy
Deno G. Himonas
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellee

79504.1

21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this the^Wday of March, 1994,1 caused two (2) true and correct
copies of the Brief of Appellee to be hand-delivered to:
Russell C. Fericks
Nathan R. Hyde
Gerald J. Lallatin
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
700 Key Bank Tower
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

79504.1

22

Exhibit A

615

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

ness. Upon objection of a party to any of the
items thus submitted or upon a showing that the
form of statement is insufficient, the master may
require a different form of statement to be furnished, or the accounts or specific items thereof
to be proved by oral examination of the accounting parties or upon written interrogatories or in
such other manner as he directs,
(e) R e p o r t
(1) Contents and filing. The master shall
prepare a report upon the matters submitted to
him by the order of reference and, if required to
make findings of fact and conclusions of law, he
shall set them forth in the report. He shall file
the report with the clerk of the court and in an
action to be tried without a jury, unless otherwise directed by the order of reference, shall file
with it a transcript of the proceedings and of the
evidence and the original exhibits. The clerk
shall forthwith mail to all parties notice of the
filing.
(2) In non-jury actions. In an action to be
tried without a jury the court shall accept the
master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.
Within 10 days after being served with notice of
the filing of the report any party may serve written objections thereto upon the other parties. Application to the court for action upon the report
and upon objections thereto shall be by motion
and upon notice as prescribed in Rule 6(d). The
court after hearing may adopt the report or may
modify it or may reject it in whole or in part or
may receive further evidence or may recommit it
with instructions.
(3) In j u r y a c t i o n s . In an action to be tried by
a jury the master shall not be directed to report
the evidence. His findings upon the issues submitted to him are admissible as evidence of the
matters found and may be read to the jury, subject to the ruling of the court upon any objections
in point of law which may be made to the report.
(4) S t i p u l a t i o n a s to findings. The effect of a
master's report is the same whether or not the
parties have consented to the reference; but,
when the parties stipulate that a master's findings of fact shall be final, only questions of law
arising upon the report shall thereafter be considered.
(5) Draft r e p o r t . Before filing his report a
master may submit a draft thereof to counsel for
all parties for the purpose of receiving their suggestions.
(0 O b j e c t i o n s to a p p o i n t m e n t of m a s t e r . A
party may object to the appointment of any person as
a master on the same grounds as a party maylchallenge for cause any prospective trial juror in the trial
of a civil action. Such objections must be heard and
disposed of by the court in the same manner as a
motion.
(Amended effective J a n . 1, 1987.)
P A R T VII.
JUDGMENT.
R u l e 54. J u d g m e n t s ; c o s t s .
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these
rules includes a decree and any order from which an
appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of
pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of
prior proceedings.

Rule 54

(b) J u d g m e n t upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one
claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than ail of the claims or parties
only upon an express determination by the court that
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express
direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of
such determination and direction, any order or other
form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and
the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of
all the parties.
(c) Demand for j u d g m e n t
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against
whom a judgment is entered by default, every
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled,
even if the party has not demanded such relief in
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one
or more of several claimants; and it may, when
the justice of the case requires it, determine the
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves.
(2) J u d g m e n t by d e f a u l t A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in
the demand for judgment.
(d) C o s t s .
(1) T o w h o m a w a r d e d . Except when express
provision therefor is made either in a statute of
this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed
as of course to the prevailing party unless the
court otherwise directs; provided, however,
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is
taken, costs of the action, other t h a n costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for
review, shall abide the final determination of the
cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers
and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent
permitted by law.
(2) H o w a s s e s s e d . The party who claims his
costs must within five days after the entry of
judgment serve upon the adverse party against
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court
a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct,
•and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party
dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within
seven days after service of the memorandum of
costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed
by the court in whicn the judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after
the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the
service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment,
shall nevertheless be considered as served and
filed on the date judgment is entered.
(3), (4) [Deleted.]
(e) I n t e r e s t and c o s t s to be included in the
j u d g m e n t The clerk must include in any judgment
signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision
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from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the
same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must,
within two days after the costs have been taxed or
ascertained, in any case where not included in the
judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the
judgment docket.
(Amended effective J a n u a r y 1, 1985.)
Rule 55. Default.
(a) D e f a u l t
(1) E n t r y . When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk
shall enter his default.
(2) Notice to p a r t y in default. After the
entry of the default of any party, as provided in
Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in default any notice of
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be
served on a party to the action or proceeding,
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or
in the event that it is necessary for the court to
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of
damages of the nondefaulting party.
(b) J u d g m e n t . Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(1) By t h e c l e r k . When the plaintiffs claim
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a
sum which can by computation be made certain,
and the defendant has been personally served
otherwise than by publication or by personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon request
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the
amount due and costs against the defendant, if
he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if
he is not an infant or incompetent person.
(2) By t h e c o u r t . In all other cases the party
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to
the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is
necessary to take an account or to determine the
amount of damages or to establish the truth of
any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it
deems necessary and proper.
ic) S e t t i n g a s i d e default. For good cause shown
the court may set aside an entry of default and. if a
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60<b).
1 .
td> Plaintiffs, c o u n t e r c l a i m a n t s , cross-claima n t s . The provisions of this rule apply whether the
party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded
a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c).
(e) J u d g m e n t a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e o r officer o r
a g e n c y thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer or
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the
court.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.)
Rule 56. S u m m a r y j u d g m e n t
(a) For c l a i m a n t . A party seeking to recover upon
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expi-
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ration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judg.
ment by the adverse party ,~move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine
issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) C a s e not fully adjudicated o n m o t i o n . If on
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make
an order specifying the facts t h a t appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which
the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the
trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) F o r m of affidavits; f u r t h e r t e s t i m o n y ; defense r e q u i r e d . Supporting and opposing affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and
shall show affirmatively t h a t the affiant is competent
to testify to tne matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing t h a t
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him.
(0 W h e n affidavits are unavailable. Should it
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment or may
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits m a d e in b a d faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court a t any time t h a t
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party em-
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ploying them to pay to the other party the amount of
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may
be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Rule 57. Declaratory judgments.
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to Chapter 33 of Title 78, U.C.A. 1953,
shall be in accordance with these rules, and the right
to trial by jury may be demanded under the circumstances and in the manner provided in Rules 38 and
39. The existence of another adequate remedy does
not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases
where it is appropriate. The court may order a speedy
hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and
may advance it on the calendar.
Rule 58A. E n t r y .
(a) J u d g m e n t u p o n t h e v e r d i c t of a j u r y . Unless
the court otherwise directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict of a
jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed.
If there is a special verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories returned by
a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the
appropriate judgment which shall be forthwith
signed by the clerk and filed.
(b) J u d g m e n t in o t h e r c a s e s . Except as provided
in Subdivision (a) hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of
Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge
and filed with the clerk.
<c) W h e n j u d g m e n t e n t e r e d ; notation in register of a c t i o n s a n d j u d g m e n t d o c k e t . A judgment is
complete and shall be deemed entered for all purposes, except the creation of a lien on real property,
when the same is signed and filed as herein above
provided. The clerk shall immediately make a notation of the judgment in the register of actions and the
judgment docket.
(d) Notice of s i g n i n g or e n t r y of j u d g m e n t . The
prevailing party shall promptly give notice of the
signing or entry of judgment to all other parties and
shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk
of the court. However, the time for filing a notice of
appeal is not affected by the notice requirement of
this provision
(e> J u d g m e n t after d e a t h of a p a r t y . If a party
dies after a verdict or decision upon any issue of fact
and before judgment, judgment may nevertheless be
rendered thereon.
(f) J u d g m e n t by confession. Whenever a judgment by confession is authorized by statute, the party
seeking the same must file with the. clerk of the court
in which the judgment is to be errtered a statement,
verified by the defendant, to the following effect(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money
due or to become due. it shall concisely state the
claim and that the sum confessed therefor is
justly due or to become due;
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the
purpose of securing the plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim
and that the sum confessed therefor does not exceed the same;
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for
a specified sum.
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the statement, and enter in the judgment docket, a judgment
of the court for the amount confessed, with costs of
entry, if any.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; J a n . 1, 1987.)

Rule 59

Rule 58B. Satisfaction of j u d g m e n t
(a) Satisfaction by owner or attorney. A judgment may he satisfied, in whole or in part, as to any
or all of the judgment debtors, by the owner thereof,
or by the attorney of record of the judgment creditor
where no assignment of the judgment has been filed
and such attorney executes such satisfaction within
eight years after the entry of the judgment, in the
following m a n n e r (1) by written instrument, duly acknowledged by such owner or attorney; or (2) by acknowledgment of such satisfaction signed by the
owner or attorney and entered on the docket of the
judgment in the county where first docketed, with the
date affixed and witnessed by the clerk. Every satisfaction of a part of the judgment, or as to one or more
of the judgment debtors, shall state the amount paid
thereon or for the release of such debtors, naming
them.
(b) Satisfaction by order of court. When a judgment shall have been fully paid and not satisfied of
record, or when the satisfaction of judgment shall
have been lost, the court in which such judgment was
recovered may, upon motion and satisfactory proof,
authorize the attorney of the judgment creditor to
satisfy the same, or may enter an order declaring the
same satisfied and direct satisfaction to be entered
upon the docket.
(c) Entry by clerk. Upon receipt of a satisfaction
of judgment, duly executed and acknowledged, the
clerk shall file the same with the papers in the case,
and enter it on the register of actions. He shall also
enter a brief statement of the substance thereof, including the amount paid, on the margin of the judgment docket, with the date of filing of such satisfaction.
(d) Effect of satisfaction. When a judgment shall
have been satisfied, in whole or in part, or as to any
judgment debtor, and such satisfaction entered upon
the docket by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the
extent of such satisfaction, be discharged and cease to
be a lien. In case of partial satisfaction, if any execution shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, such
execution shall be endorsed with a memorandum of
such partial satisfaction and shall direct the officer to
collect only the residue thereof, or to collect only from
the judgment debtors remaining liable thereon.
\e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other
c o u n t i e s . When any satisfaction of a judgment shall
have been entered on the judgment docket of the
county where such judgment was first docketed, a
certified transcript of satisfaction, or a certificate by
the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed with
the clerk of the district court in any other county
where the judgment may have been docketed. Thereupon a similar entry in the judgment docket shall be
made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall
have the same effect as in the county where the same
was originally entered.
R u l e 59. N e w trials; a m e n d m e n t s of j u d g m e n t
(a) G r o u n d s . Subject to the provisions of Rule 6 1 ,
a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties
and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, t h a t on a motion for a
new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court
may open the judgment if one has been entered, take
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions,
and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court,
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or

Rule 60
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abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any
one or more of the jurors have been induced to
assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the
court, by resort to a determination by chance or
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for
the party making the application, which he could
not. with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of
passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) T i m e for motion. A motion for a new trial
shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry
of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under Subdivision <a)i 1),
(2), (3). or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit.
Whenever a motion for a new trial in based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within
which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be
served may be extended for an additional period not
exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause
shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The
court may permit reply affidavits.
<d> On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days
after entry of judgment the court of its own initiative
may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a parly,
and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor.
»e» Motion to a l t e r o r a m e n d a j u d g m e n t . A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served
not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Rule 60. Relief from j u d g m e n t or o r d e r .
•a> Clerical m i s t a k e s . Clerical mistakes in judgments, oruers or other parts of the record and error.therein arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative
or on the motion of any party and attvr such notice, if
any, as the court orders. During the pendency ot an
appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the
appeal is docketed in the appellate court. a.-.u thereafter while the appeal is pending may he so corrected
with leave of the appellate court.
(b) M i s t a k e s ; i n a d v e r t e n c e ; e x c u s a b l e neglect;
n e w l y d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e ; f r a u d , etc. On mouon
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence couid not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for
any cause, the summons in an action has not been
personally served upon the defendant as required by
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in
said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6> the judgment

618

has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prio
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the opera,
tion of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), o }
or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality
of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does
not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action.
Rule 61. Harmless error.
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of
evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any
of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment.
(a) S t a y upon entry of judgment. Execution or
other proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue
immediately upon the entry of the judgment, unless
the court in its discretion and on such conditions for
the security of the adverse party as are proper, otherwise directs.
(b* Stay on m o t i o n for n e w trial or for judgment. In its discretion and on such conditions for the
security of the adverse party as are proper, the court
may stay the execution of, or any proceedings to enforce, a judgment pending the disposition of a motion
for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment made
pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for relief from a
luduioeru or order made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a
rnoti'in for judgment in accordance with a motion for
a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a
motion for amendment to the findings or for additional findings made pursuant to Rule 52(b).
•c- Injunction p e n d i n g a p p e a l . When an appeal
is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment
Lrra:it::i;j. ci.-suivir.^. or denying an injunction, the
court m it- discretion may suspend, modify, restore,
or gram an injunction during the pendency of the
appeal upon such conditions as it considers proper for
the secuntv of the rights of the adverse party.
• d» Stay u p o n a p p e a l . When an appeal is taken
the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain a sta>. uniess such a stay is otherwise prohibited
by law or tnese rules. The bond may be given at or
alter t h - time of filing the notice of appeal. The stay
^ elective when the supersedeas bond is approved by
the court
*e i S t a y in favor of t h e state, or a g e n c y thereof.
When an appeal is taken by the United States, the
state of Utah, or an officer or agency of either, or by
direction of any department of either, and the operation or enforcement of the judgment is stayed, no
bond, obligation, or other security shall be required
from the appellant.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
m AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM
DECISION

MARIAMERCEDES POWER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RIVERVIEW FINANCIAL CORP.
Defendant.

CASE # 10741

The above matter came on for argument on the defendant's "Motion for Relief from
Order." The Plaintiff was represented by Russell c Fericks and Nathan R. Hyde. The
Defendant was represented by Randall N. Skanchy and Deno G. Himonas. The court heard
the argument of counsel, reviewed the pleadings on file and now renders this it's
MEMORANDUM DECISION
This action arises out of the alleged termination of the employment of the plaintiff by the
defendant. Discovery has been concluded and the information relating to the parties
employment relationship has been developed and is essentially undisputed for the purposes of
this decision.
The plaintiff prepared and submitted an employment application December 1, 1988. She
was hired and worked for approximately thirteen (13) months. When seeking employment
she completed the application which stated as follows:
We are an equal opportunity employer dedicated to a policy of nondiscrimination in employment on any basis including race, creed, color, age,
sex, religion, or national origin. All employees of the Company are at-will
employees subject to termination at any time with or without cause, (emphasis
added)
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Later, on June 20, 1989 while employed and after some initial indoctrination as to the
company's policies and procedures, the plaintiff was given an Employee's Handbook which
contained additional and lengthy instructions as to the company's expectations and the
employee's expectations. In the "Acknowledgement of Receipt" signed by the plaintiff is this
language in standard size and consistently obvious location:
I understand that neither this Handbook nor any other representation by a
management official of The Company are intended to create a contract of
employment. I understand that The Company and I have the same right to end
my employment at any time for any reason, (emphasis added)
In addition, in the Employee's Handbook states, "Every employee is free to terminate his
or her employment at any time, with or without cause."
It is clear from the foregoing that the company and the employee intended to and did
create an "at-will" employment relationship.
Thereafter, Ms. Power was terminated as a result of a "reduction in force." She has
sued claiming that the employment relationship had been modified from "at-will" to an
"implied-in-fact" employment.
The court inquired of counsel as to what facts occurred to render the change. The
defendant, naturally, said the relationship remained "at will." The plaintiff said that the
relationship had changed due to the following alleged facts: 1. The company had engaged
in a course of conduct that indicated it felt otherwise than an "at will" relationship. This
course included a lengthy video tape in which the principals stated among other things that

[2]

they would be fair in dealing with employee mistakes and errors etc. 2. The plaintiff had
been promised a "new position," if she continued to work out. 3. The plaintiff was
promised consideration for a future job with a mail order facility. 4. The plaintiff was
given positive job reports and was even used to train other new employees. 5. The plaintiff,
when terminated, had not been previously warned of impending termination or deficient work
performance but was told only that there was a reduction in force. Assuming each of the
above to be true, the company could still reduce it's force and release the plaintiff "at will."
None of the above give the plaintiff a basis to conclude that her employment had been
modified from "at will."
The plaintiff feels that the issue now before the court had twice been considered by
Judges Wilkinson and Noel when previously assigned to Summit County. There is some
dispute on that since the defendant indicates that Judge Noel only considered matters in
Limine and not the matter of Summary Judgment and Judge Wilkinson did not have the
benefit of recent decisions of the Supreme Court. (Sanderson v. First Security Leasing
Company 201 Ut Adv Rep 18 [Dec. 1992] and Hodgson v. Bunzi Utah, Inc., 202 Ut Adv
Rep 22 [Dec. 1992] )
This court recognizes the undesirable nature of the master calendar system now followed
in Summit County were the Judge will change as the assignment changes. However, it is
incumbent on the Judge assigned to do the best he or she can in dealing with a case to see
that the matter is handled consistent with the Judge's best judgment under the circumstances.
[3]
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With that in mind, it is my opinion that the Motion for Relief from Order should be and the
same is hereby granted.
Considering the above cases, the undersigned feels that had the cases been available to
Judge Wilkinson, his decision would have been otherwise. I submit my reasoning as follow:
While this court recognizes, as stated by Justice Zimmerman in Sanderson, that:
the existence of an implied-in-fact contract is a factual question committed
to the sound discretion of the jury. (p. 19)
the question must be buttressed by some clear action to deviate from the "at-will"
relationship. In Sanderson it was the promise to allow Mr. Sanderson, while ill, to "take all
the time...needed, (and) do what needed to (be) done" to recover. Thus the "at-will"
employment was changed to allow Mr. Sanderson to remain off work while recovering and
further to allow him to retain the confidence that he would not be fired for doing so. The
subsequent question of fact at trial was whether Mr. Sanderson had been terminated for
absence or some for some other reason.
In the Hodgson case, Justice Howe stated the issue to be whether the defendant had
"modified" the "at-will employment status" to this plaintiff by "issuing warnings to four
(other) employees" prior to termination. The court then stated:
In order for conduct and oral statements to establish an implied-in-fact
contract, such evidence must be strong enough to overcome the presumption of
at-will employment and any inconsistent written policies and disclaimers.
In the instant case, the court finds that reasonable minds cannot differ as to the fact that

[4]
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the evidence was not strong enough to overcome the presumption that an "at will"
relationship continued and that the company had done nothing to change the "at-will"
relationship with this plaintiff. All assurances remained consistent with the "at-will" status
and when it became necessary to reduce employees, the plaintiff was let go for that reason
alone.
The court grants the defendant's motion for Summary Judgment finding that the plaintiff
was an "at-will" employee and the alleged "facts" claimed by the plaintiff are insufficient as
a matter of law to allow the matter to go to the jury for consideration.
Mr. Himonas is requested to prepare Findings and a Judgment consistent herewith and
with the record as plead and argued.

(Following the preparation of the foregoing, the plaintiffs counsel submitted a "Supplemental
Brief to Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Relief from Order." The court has reviewed the
pleading with the accompanying cases and finds that the record fails to reveal sufficient
information for the court to conclude that the plaintiff could have "justifiably" relied on
additional expressed or implied policies being applicable to her employment. The fact that
employees may have been dealt with on disciplinary matters in a different way does not
change the fact that the plaintiffs position was illiminated due to a reduction in force.)

[5]
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FILED

Randall N. Skanchy (USB #2968)
Deno G. Himonas (USB #5483)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Defendant
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARIAMERCEDES POWER,
Plaintiff,

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER

vs.

RIVER VIEW FINANCIAL
CORPORATION,

Civil No. 10741

Defendant.

Defendant's Motion for Relief for Order came on for argument on March 18,
1993. The Plaintiff was represented by Russell C. Fericks and Nathan R. Hyde of Richards,
Brandt, Miller & Nelson. The Defendant was represented by Randall N. Skanchy and Deno
G. Himonas of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough. The Court, having heard the
arguments of counsel and having reviewed the pleadings on file and the decision of the Utah
Supreme Court in Sanderson v. First Security Leasing. 844 P.2d 303 (Dec. 8, 1992), and in
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Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah. Inc.. 844 P.2d 331 (Dec. 23, 1992), is of the opinion that the
undisputed facts establish as a matter of law that Plaintiffs employment relationship with
Defendant was "at-will" and that, regardless, Defendant terminated Plaintiff "for cause" as
part of a reduction-in-force.
THEREFORE, THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES
that Defendant's Motion for Relief from Order is granted;
FURTHER ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that the Court's prior ruling
denying Defendant summary judgment on plaintiffs claim for breach of an alleged impliedin-fact employment contract to be terminated only "for cause" (Count I) is vacated; and
FINALLY ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted in its entirety.
DATED this

of May, 1993.
^ ^ Y THE COURT
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

Resell C. Fe ' ^^
^^^
Nathan R. Hyde
Attorneys for Plaintiff

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

I

/

^i£42^J^*6f7to^
Randall N. SJcanchy
Deno G. Himonas
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this the JB* day of May, 1993, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing instrument to be hand-delivered upon:
Russell C. Fericks
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Key Bank Tower, Suite 800
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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RUSSELL C. FERICKS [A3793]
NATHAN R. HYDE [A5489]
GERALD J. LALLATIN [A5986]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. BOX 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-1777
Fax N o . :
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARIAMERCEDES POWER
NOTICE

OF APPEAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
RIVERVIEW FINANCIAL
CORPORATION,

Civil No. 10741

Defendant.
Plaintiff Mariamercedes Power, by and through her counsel
of record, hereby gives notice pursuant to Rule 3, Utah R. App. P.
that she appeals to the Supreme Court of Utah the "Order on
Defendants Motion for Relief from Order" entered by this District
Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Summit County,
State of Utah on May 25, 1993 by the Honorable David S. Young.
Dated this 23rd day of June, 1993.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Z&4teS{
JSSELL V^yPERICKS
JATHAN R. HYDE
GERALD J . LALLATIN

Attorneys for Plaintiff

nnnno

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument, having been executed and entered by the
Court, has been mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this^r? ™
day of
7//s*-v- # 1993, to the following:
Randall N. Skanchy, Esq.
Deno Himonas, Esq.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-0O0-

PEDRC> TIRADO,

)

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

Deposition of:
Cindy Reisner

MRS. FIELDS COOKIES,

)

Defendants.

No. 10755

)

-0O0-

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 24th day of January,
1991, the deposition of Cindy Reisner was taken pursuant to
notice, commencing at 9:00 a.m. of said day at 50 South Main
Street, #700, Salt Lake City, Utah, before Diana Kent, a
Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for
the State of Utah.

COPY
Reporting Service, Inc.
322 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone (801) 531-0256

Statewide Reporting
National and Merit Certified Reporters
Expedited Delivery
Computerized Transcription
IBM Compatible Disks
Litigation Support Software
Video Depositions

1

A.

A year and-a-half.

2

Q.

And then you were promoted to

3

A.

Personnel Manager.

4

Q.

How does Personnel Manager differ from Human

5

—

Resources, Director of Human Resources?

6

A.

I'm over the entire department now.

7

Q.

How long were you the Personnel Manager?

8

A.

Two and-a-half years, I believe.

9
10
11

years.

No.

Three

From 1987 to 1990.

Q.

So at the time of the events involved in these

cases, you were the Personnel Manager?

12

A.

Thatfs correct.

13

Q.

When did you become the Director of Human

14

Resources?

15

A.

Officially, January 2, 1991.

16

Q.

Unofficially?

17

A.

I was told December 31, 1990.

18

Q.

Are you a department head?

19

A.

Yes, I am.

20

Q.

As the Personnel Manager, who was your

21

department head?

22

A.

Dan Murphy.

23

Q.

Have you taken over Dan Murphy*s duties?

24

A.

Yes, I have.

25

Q.

Is that a result of his moving onto other
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1

A.

Being laid off is when there is no need for the

2

position or there are too many employees in a store or the

3

store is closing.

4

terminated, I usually think if we are terminating someone,

5

we are firing someone.

That type of thing.

6

Q.

7

MR. HIMONES:

8

A.

9
10
11

And being

Termination means firing to you?
Let me offer

Not totally.

go ahead first.

Termination is terminating one's

employment, regardless of the reason.

That's why it is

called "termination".
MR. HIMONES:

Let me offer a clarification, and this

12

might help you.

13

Interrogatory answers that we need to correct where it ends

14

with the word "termination".

15

It should be "for cause" afterwards, to make it consistent

16

with all the other pleadings.

17

your inquiry, I don't know.

18

Q.

There is one spot in one of the

There is an omission there.

If that did or didn't spark

Well, I'm just wondering in your professional

19

field of Human Resources, "termination" means to end the

20

employment.

Right?

21

A.

That's correct.

22

Q.

And "firing" is ending the employment because

23

the employee did something wrong?

24

A.

That's correct.

25

Q*

And "laid off" is ending the employment because
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1

the company's economic circumstances justify it?

2

A.

That's correct.

3

Q.

Is "laid off" synonymous with "reduction in

4

force", in your mind?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Okay.

7

Does "reduction in force" mean something

other than "laid off"?

8

A.

No.

9

Q.

Was Miss Power terminated for a reduction in

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

Or was she fired for bad job performance?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

Was Pedro Tirado terminated for bad job

10

15

force?

performance?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

So he was fired?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Was Joe Trembly fired?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

He wasnft laid off?

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

Do you know who Mariamercedes Power is?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

When did you first become aware of her?

84
1

department to the Training Department in early '89. I don't

2

remember the exact date.

3

Training Department, she did no further work for me.

Once she transferred to the

4

Q.

Is she still with the company?

5

A.

Yes, she is.

6

Q.

In the Park City office?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Do you know who absorbed the responsibilities

9

that Miss Power was performing before her termination?

10

A.

E. G. Perry and her assistant.

11

Q.

Who is E. G.'s assistant?

12

A.

Lisa Richards.

13

Q.

Were you involved in Amanda Aratta's

14

termination?

15

A.

No, I wasn't.

16

Q.

You weren't consulted on that before it was

18

A.

Not me personally, no.

19

Q.

Who was?

20

A.

I believe Dan Murphy may have been.

21

Q.

Who would he have been consulted by?

22

MR. HIMONES:

23

A.

17

done?

Objection.

Lack of foundation.

I really don't know for sure who would have

24

consulted him.

It could have been Paul or the RDO.

25

talked to all of us, to both of us, on occasion.

They

But I
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Exhibit F

RUSSELL C. FERICKS [A3793]
NATHAN R. HYDE [A5489]
GERALD J. LALLATIN [A5986]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-1777
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506
IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
APPELLANT'S
DOCKETING STATEMENT

MARIAMERCEDES POWER
Plaintiff and Appellant,

(May be assigned to Court of
Appeals)

vs.
RIVERVIEW FINANCIAL
CORPORATION,

Case No. 930315

Defendant and Appellee.

Appellant Mariamercedes Power ("Power"), by and through
her counsel of record and pursuant to Rule 9, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, submits the following Docketing Statement.
1.

JURISDICTION: The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

of Utah is conferred by U.C.A. § 78-2-2(3)(j) 1992.
2.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:

This is an appeal from a

summary judgment in the Third Judicial District Court of Summit
County, State of Utah, Judge David S. Young presiding.
3.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: The "Order on Defendant's Motion

for Relief From Order" which is the subject of this appeal was
entered by the Trial Court on May 25, 1993 and resulted in

dismissal of all of Power's claims and causes of action.
4.

DATE OF NOTICE OF APPEAL:

Notice of Appeal was

filed with the Third Judicial District Court of Summit County on
June 24, 1993, and with the Utah Supreme Court on June 25, 1993.
5.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

Plaintiff and Appellant Power

was hired by Defendant and Appellee Riverview Financial Corporation
("Riverview") on

December

1,

1988

and

approximately 13 months of employment.

was

terminated

after

Power brought an action

against Riverview in the Third Judicial District Court for Summit
County,

State of Utah alleging that she had been

improperly

terminated in violation of an implied-in-fact agreement that she
would only be terminated for cause.
In various pleadings, Power alleged that statements in
the company documents and explicit statements and actions by
company executives created an implied-in-fact agreement that she
would not be terminated without cause.

She further alleged that

she was terminated without cause and not as part of a reduction in
force.
On November 27, 1991, a hearing was held in the Third
Judicial District, Judge Homer Wilkinson presiding, on Riverview's
Motion for Summary Judgement in which it asked for dismissal of all
causes of action.

Riverview alleged that Power was an at-will

employee who had been terminated as part of a reduction in force.
Judge Wilkinson dismissed some of Power's causes of action but
denied the motion to dismiss the claims of an implied-in-fact
contract.
2

Before an order was entered, Riverview filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the court's denial of its requested summary
judgment.

In March 1992, Judge Wilkinson, having considered the

Motion For Reconsideration, entered an order leaving the impliedin-fact contact claim intact.
Trial

on

the

implied-in-fact

contract

claims

was

commenced in Summit County, Judge Frank G. Noel presiding. As part
of the trial proceedings, Riverview presented a motion in limine,
again asking that Power's proferred evidence of an implied-in-fact
contract cause of action not be allowed into evidence. Judge Noel
denied the motion, ruling that the existence of an implied-in-fact
contract was a question of fact for the jury based on the totality
of the evididence.

On the second day of the trial after plaintiff

had commenced presentation of her case, a mistrial occurred due to
the disqualification of one of the jurors.
On February 25, 1993, Riverview filed a Motion for Relief
From Order asking the Third District Court to again reconsider the
court's Judge Wilkinson's denial of Riverview' Motion For Summary
Judgment on Power's claim of an alleged implied-in-fact employment
contract.

Riverview cited the publication of two cases decided by

the Utah Supreme Court as the basis for reconsideration.

Power

objected to the motion both on the merits and on the propriety of
a district

court

judge overruling

the

"law of the case" as

established by another district court judge.
On April 25, 1993, Judge Young entered an order vacating
Judge Wilkinson's March 1992 order, thereby granting MFC's Motion
3

For Summary Judgment for dismissal of the implied-in-fact contract
claims, stating that "the undisputed facts establish as a matter of
law" that Power's employment was at-will.
6.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL:
a.

Was summary dismissal of Power's claims in

error because disputed issues of material facts, when considered in
a

light

most

favorable

to

Power,

establish

an

employment

relationship terminable for cause only.
b.
a

summary

decision

Was the District Court in error in arriving at
that

Power was

terminated

as part

of a

"reduction in force" when that fact was controverted by Power.
c.

Was the District Court in error in allowing

Riverview's motion to be heard since it no new facts were presented
and such a motion is contrary to the "law of the case" doctrine,
and because a District Court judge may not vacate the prior
decision of another District Court judge.
Standard

of Review:

All

issues are

challenges to

conclusions of law and are therefore reviewable without according
deference to the Trial Court's conclusions of law, and viewing the
facts in the light most favorable to Appellants. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield v. State. 779 P.2d
7.

634 (Utah 1989).

CITATIONS:

Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165 (Utah 1992).
Heslop v. Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992).
Sanderson v. First Security Leasing. 844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992).
Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah. Inc.. 844 P.2d 331 (Utah 1992).
4

Berube v. Fashion Ctr. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).
Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc.. 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991).
Harvard v. Harward. 526 P.2d 1183 (Utah 1974)
Peav v. Peav. 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980)
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Contractors. Inc.. 761 P.2d 42 (Utah
App. 1988).
8.

PRIOR APPEALS: There have been no prior appeals in

this case.

DATED this _£_ day of July, 1993.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

RpSSELLvC^ FERICKS
JATHAN R. HYDE
GERALD J. LALLATIN
Attorneys for Appellant

5

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument, having been executed and entered by the
Court, has^een mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this /5~"^
day of ^/y^Jy^
, 1993, to the following:
.

^

^

Randall N. Skanchy, Esq.
Deno G. Himonas, Esq.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Exhibit G

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-OOO-

PEDRO TIRADC>,

)

Plaintiff,

)

Deposition of:
Paul Baird

VS.

MRS. FIELDS COOKIES,

)

Defendants.

No. 10755

)

-0O0-

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 10th day of January,
1991, the deposition of Paul Baird was taken pursuant to
notice, commencing at 1:30 p.m. of said day at 50 South
Main, #700, Salt Lake City, Utah, before Diana Kent, a
Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for
the State of Utah.

C@PY
Rocky Mountain
Repotting Service, Inc.
322 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City Utah 84111
Phone (801) 531-0256

Statewide Reporting
National and Merit Certified Reporters
Expedited Delivery
Computerized Transcription
IBM Compatible Disks
Litigation Support Software
Video Depositions

4
for Diana to be able to take down the answer.

1
2

A.

All right.

3

Q.

State your full name and address for the

A.

My name is Paul Richardson Baird and I reside

record.

4
5
6

1

at 3006 East Dickens Place in Salt Lake City.

7

Q.

Why did you terminate Mariamercedes Power?

8

A.

Maria's position was eliminated and, as a

9

result of that, her employment with the company was severed.

10

Q.

It had nothing to do with her job performance?

11

A.

No.

12

Q.

So her performance was fine for you?

13

A.

Her performance was not germane to the

14

position.

15
(Discussion off the record was held.)

16
17
18

A.

I eliminated the position as a budgetary issue.

19

The decision of which position to eliminate was based on the

20

way the position had performed for me in the eight months

21

that I had it.

22
23
24
25

Q.

The way the position had performed or the way

Maria had performed?
A.

I think they are one and the same.

only person who had been in the position.

She is the

Q.

1

So, in your mind, it was both her performance

2

and the need to eliminate the position that caused her

3

termination?

4

A.

5

separate event.

6

department head, make a decision as to which position got

7

eliminated.

8

assistance that I was getting, I made the decision that the

9

Administrative Assistant position is the one I would

10

No.

The need to eliminate the position was one
And then I had to, as an executive and a

Based on the amount of productivity and

eliminate.

11

Q.

What were the other choices?

12

A.

Two positions in technical support.

These are

13

people who write computer programs, deal with computers, et

14

cetera.

15

Q.

16

operational go?

17

A.

Right.

18

Q.

Before you terminated Mariamercedes, you also

19

So you kept the technical and let the

The Administrative Assistant position.

terminated Amanda Aratta.

20

A.

Correct.

21

Q.

And you terminated her on the last day of

22

December, I think, 1989?

23

A.

I don't recall the date.

24

Q.

It was before Miss Power was terminated.

25

A.

Yes, that is correct.

2

Did you terminate Miss Arattafs position or did

Q.

1

you terminate Miss Aratta?
A,

3

We reduced the position.

4

Administrative Assistants.

5

went to zero.

We had two

We went to one, and subsequently

Q.

So you eliminated Miss Aratta f s position, as

8

A.

Correct.

9

Q.

Now, did you make any effort to transfer Miss

6
7

10

well?

Power to another position in the company?

11

A.

No.

12

Q.

Why not?

13

A.

Based on the company's position of overhead

14

expenses for the upcoming year and the fact that there were

15

no budgeted positions, I felt there was no point in trying

16

to place her inside the company.

17

Q.

Same thing with Miss Aratta?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Is that the company's policy, to eliminate

20

people and positions simultaneously?

21

A.

I don't know that there is any such policy.

22

Q.

Is that your practice, Paul Baird?

23

A.

I would have to say that each situation is

24

unique, depending on the particulars of the business at the

25

point in time.

There's a lot of factors to be involved.

In

1

I

this situation, given that it was a corporate office

2

|

position and the relative number of available positions was

3

|

limited, in that case it was a very good decision.

4

I

are times, in field operations positions, where you may have

There

5

twelve district sales managers in a city and you may offer a

6

person a position as a store manager because they are

7

available.

8

predominantly drives it.

9

Q.

So given the availability, I think that that

Okay.

So you think that you had good cause to

10

terminate her; Miss Power.

11

MR. HIMONES:

Object.

That's vague and ambiguous.

12

"Good cause" could mean something else in the employment

13

setting.

14

A.

As an employer who clearly employees at will,

15

we have the right to terminate at any point in time.

16

issue of cause was not entered into.

17

Q.

So the

Let's review what you just testified to, Paul.

18

You eliminated Mariamercedes Power because of economic

19

circumstances, apparently.

Correct?

20

A,

Correct.

21

Q.

And because her performance was such that you

22

didn't feel like it would be beneficial to the company to

23

transfer her to another position.

24
25

A.

No.

Is that correct?

I stated, I believe, that the decision to

eliminate a position in the company was economic.

The

1

I

decision of which position was eliminated was based on the

2

|

relative benefit each position would bring me in the new

3

I

year, with the reduced assistance from all areas of the

4

business,

5

Q.

So it didn't have anything to do with

6

Mariamercedesfs performance, per sef but the fact that that

7

position hadn't been a constructive part of your line-up.

8
9

MR. HIMONES:

I object to that characterization.

testimony is what it is.

10

different light.

11

Q.

That casts it in a slightly

Well, I intended to.

And I'm testing the

12

limits of his fairly obscure explanation.

13

again, is, your decision to eliminate the position, and

14

consequently Miss Power, was because the position had not

15

been profitable for you and, therefore, it was a position

16

you wanted to eliminate in the line-up.

17
18
19

MR. HIMONES:

His

Objection.

So my question,

Asked and answered.

Go

ahead.
A.

The position

the decision to eliminate

20

head count in the office as to number of positions working

21

for me was one decision.

22

the decision of which position was eliminated was based on

23

my judgment as to which one would provide me the most

24

assistance in the upcoming year.

25

are based on the performance of all the individuals

Once that decision was made, then

That decision and judgment

9
1

involved.

2

Q.

3
4
5
6
7

Okay.

Now, you didn't terminate Mariamercedes

because you don't like her personally?
A.

No.

I like her very well.

I think she is a

good person.
Q.

And you didn't terminate her because you don't

like women; did you?

8

A.

Certainly not.

9

Q.

And you didn't terminate her because you got up

10

I work for a woman.

on the wrong side of the bed that morning; did you?

11

A.

No.

12

Q.

And you didn't terminate her because you just

13

felt like making an example of your power to the other

14

people in the company; did you?

15

A.

Absolutely not.

16

Q,

And you didn't terminate her because somebody

17

else told you to; did you?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

It was your decision.

20

A.

Correct.

21

Q.

So you didn't terminate her at will.

22
23
24
25

terminated her for a reason.
A.

Right?

The reason was that the position was

eliminated.
Q.

Right?

Okay.

You

10
1
2
3

A.

And being an at will employer, then we could

make the decision to terminate.
Q.

Are you claiming that you terminated her at

4

will or are up claiming you terminated her because of

5

economic circumstances?

6

Which one?

That's two different things, Paul,

7

A.

I'm not sure I understand the question.

8

Q.

Did you terminate her because of economic

9

circumstances?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Do you believe that you are immune from this

12
13
14
15
16
17

lawsuit because you are an at will employer?
A.

I believe that the company, as an at will

employer, is in a position that this lawsuit is groundless.
Q.

So you think no matter what the reason the

company has, this lawsuit is groundless?
A.

Yes.

Just as I believe that my superiors could

18

walk in today and terminate me, and pursuing this action

19

would have no beneficial effect.

20

Q.

I assume you wouldn't want them to do that?

21

A.

I would

there are days where I might

22

prefer that they did, quite honestly.

23

general course, I would prefer they didn't.

24
25

Q.

But no, not as a

The record should reflect that Mr. Baird has a

wink in his eye and a grin on his face in having said that.

11

1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

It is two different things, Paul, and I want

3

you to make a distinction for me.

You believe that this

4

suit is groundless because Mrs. Fields is an at will

5

employer.

6

A.

Correct.

7

Q.

But you are claiming that you terminated

Right?

8

Mariamercedes for a reason, and that was the economic

9

circumstances.

10

A.

Right?

The underlying circumstances behind her

11

position being eliminated and her subsequent termination

12

from Mrs. Fields was economic.

13
14
15

Q.

Thank you.

Now, where did those economic

circumstances develop?
A.

The origination of the Administrative Assistant

16

position to me came about in April of 1989 when I added the

17

position, that was not in the budget originally for the

18

year, as a new director.

19

with the company, I felt I needed administrative support and

20

I felt the field people who reported to me would need

21

administrative support.

22

permission, an unbudgeted position for the balance of the

23

year in both the Administrative Assistant to me, and the

24

Assistant to the Administrative Assistant to me.

25

complex.

As a new Director of Operations

So I formed, with my supervisor's

It sounds

So there were two additional people who were, in
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